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Everyone has a period of infancy and childhood, and though we can remember it, no
one can go back and grasp it firmly. It happens however, that some attempts in literature and
thought tend to recover it retroactively in a certain type of recalling or dreaming.
In his autobiographical essay, Edward Said once mentioned a similarity between sleep-
lessness and infancy by addressing both states. It is a remarkable suggestion for writing about
childhood and infancy from a critical way of thought. One can imagine how significant Said’s
childhood was for the elaboration of his indomitable critical spirit and attitude from a cursory
reading of his autobiography. Certainly he presented varied anecdotes in his life in this au-
tobiography, especially of his childhood which retains euphoric tonality on the one hand, but
also sometimes sounds bitter-sweet influencing his political or ethnical position on the other
hand. Said compares his annoying sleeplessness with an operation of memory and recollec-
tion, that is to say, combines the experience of sleeplessness with recalling a time in the past,
especially childhood. 
“I’ve thought in fact that this book in a fundamental way is all about sleepless, all
about the silence of wakefulness and, in my case, the need for conscious recollec-
tion and articulation that have been a substitute for sleep.” (OP: 217)
As time passes, the atmosphere of euphoria which embraced children in their early days
dissolves and conversely emerges as a harder and more complicated period of adulthood. A
memory of the period of infancy is no longer located in the doze of life, but rather is engulfed
in a wakefulness of working time and daily activity. The entangled rhythm of sleeplessness
and awaking, however, continues to be pulsing in the process of time that flies away rapidly.
As the body needs a calm sleep to survive physically, sleeplessness can haunt us regardless
of our wishes. Sleeplessness annoys us at an intermediary blur zone between sleeping and
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──Abstract
This paper examines with a relationship between infancy and critical theory by addressing a
Japanese postwar intellectual who is a kind of counterparts of Frankfurt School scholar in Euro/Am
context, Fujita Shozo, and one of his texts in the details.
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awaking, just as a critical moment of adolescence between the periods of infancy and adult-
hood tortures us in some psychological disturbances as its accompaniment. Nevertheless, a
neutrality of sleeplessness and awaking is the premised condition for writing and literature,
as Maurice Blanchot often clarified in his critical literature theory. The very experience of
sleeplessness as an activity of waiting for something somehow holds a utopian yearning
which is related to desire and an attitude to be critical against the grain of the majority and
society.
This essay aims at presenting a kind of comparative analysis between Japan and Europe
on critical theory in terms of infancy. My hypothesis here is so simple that it can be summa-
rized as follows: A lineage of critical theory frequently addresses the period of infancy, or
put differently, the notion of childhood is frequently summoned by critical theory in a general
sense as well as in some layers of social thoughts in postwar Japan. Based on this perspective,
the reason why critical theory has been so drawn to the period of infancy is examined in this
paper.
By the generic term “critical theory,” one can easily assume the Frankfurt School which
is represented by such authors as Adorno, Horkheimer, Bloch and Benjamin, etc. More con-
ceptually, it indicates a theoretical posture of combining Marxism and (post-) Freudian psy-
choanalysis in terms of social (class) conflicts and individual unconsciousness or affective
repressions. Putting aside the relatively restricted definition of critical theory by the Frankfurt
School, it is also possible to suppose its Japanese counterparts, which had not necessarily
formed a “school” or “group” in a strict sense, were considered to be the currents that are
envisioned as another version of critical theory among some of the influential intellectuals
in the postwar period of Japan.
In fact, the reference to infancy or childhood is readily confirmed in the works by the
authors belonging to the Frankfurt School. No one can forget the essays on childhood by
Benjamin about his personal memory and experience in Berlin, for instance. Their experience
has also been totally “expropriated” under the advent of fascism and cultural industry. Walter
Benjamin wrote about the “poverty of experience” in his essay which was entitled by the
same phrase (1933). All men in modernity are deprived of the certainty of their own biography
and identity. Certainly the consciousness that we are deprived of in our own experience is a
symptom of the 20th century as the era of turns and upheavals. The collective experience
that had passed through great historical turmoil in this century can be overlapped with that
of infancy in a personal life history. Thus the account on infancy and childhood retains sig-
nificance in viewing a living world (Lebenswelt) critically. Herein the distinction between Er-
lebnis and Erfahrung in the German language is un-negligible in taking account of the
experience of infancy. Benjamin had succinctly remarked on this point, in which the former
tends to enter into a closure of immanency of the self, while the latter opens up to an exteri-
ority of the reflexive self. Generally a lineage of critical theory inclines to sympathize with
the latter conception, which, for instance, is observed in the spontaneous playing activity of
infancy. The period of infancy is to be envisioned as a platform of critical thinking and living,
especially of the case of assembling toys, listening or remixing narratives, and playing games,
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all which will be explored in this essay.
In his essay “An Experience of a Loss–The history of ideas of the game of hide and
seek” (Aru Soshitsu no Keiken–Kakurenbou no Seishinshi, 1981), Fujita Shozo argued about the
disappearance or withering of kakurenbou (the game of hide and seek) in the urbanity and street
culture of Japan. Hide and seek as a game had been swept away from the street-scene of
cityscape throughout the period of high economic growth in postwar Japan because of the
rapid ongoing urbanization and brutal omnipresent eruption of auto-mobility. Car culture had
radically transformed the meaning of passage (roji) which represented an “intimate outside”–
or “extimacy” in the Lacanian sense–as both an entrance to society and an exit from the
household that was defined as the private sphere or intimate sphere distinguished from the
public sphere. But his speculation is neither to be reduced as a mere plea that indulges in the
nostalgia for the past nor a criticism and accusation against the hasty gentrification in the ur-
banity of Japan. 
Interestingly, in his book entitled “Profanation,” George Agamben, Italian Philosopher,
also addresses the game of hide and seek. 
“Children take a particular pleasure in hiding, not because they will be found in
the end, but by the very act of hiding, of being concealed in a laundry basket or a
cabinet, of curling up in the corner of an attic to the point of almost disappearing.
There is an incomparable joy, a special excitement that children are unwilling to
renounce for any reason.” (PR:15)
It is clear that Agamben sees some kinds of pleasure and joy within the act of hiding
that is combined with the feeling of certain alienation and helplessness that would have pre-
vailed well before the deployment of urbanization and gentrification of contemporary soci-
eties. What is noteworthy is that the astonishment becomes a great resource of a critical way
of thinking and behavior in this playing game. Then, from within both joyful and suffered
experiences of the game, people might elaborate their own critical, or at least creative, po-
tentially built-in attitudes in everyday life.      
Let me turn back to the text by Fujita in its details. The child in the hide and seek game
who is designated as “it” (in Japan the child is designated oni meaning demon) has to embrace an
essential solitude and deserted experience within a haphazard mutation and condensed shock
in their affection by playing the game blissfully (EHI:13). So in that sense, this game is a kind
of simulation or mimicry of an exiled experience from society and community in which a
series of principal social experiences are to be articulated as if the fragmentary affects and
desires were culminated in a kind of abstract painting or toy. Through playing this game,
children as players unconsciously come to formulate “a tiny placenta (or nucleus of Chora in
Greek language) of experience” (Keiken no Taiban) in their deepest layer of mind. By this termi-
nology “a placenta of experience,” Fujita meant a jumping board, that is, a platform from
which one enters the experience of the private realm into that of sociality. He defines this
game as a micro-model of articulating our experience, out of whose operation children learn
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and accept the plurality of living forms of everyday experience. At the core of the game the
social reality foreshadows our personal experience which is that of a “wandering child” or
an experience of a child in exile and isolation desertion. This aspect of the game should be
examined by the ethnographic or folkloristic idea later, along with the line of thought de-
ployed by Fujita. 
Fujita contends that both the worlds of the worlds of the Tom Thumb story and the game
of hide and seek have something in common in terms of their narrative/actualizing structure,
although there is un-negligible difference in that the former is basically told for and heard
by an audience–mainly children in their beds by parents storytelling before sleeping, while
the latter is constituted by a performative collaboration among gather children as the players.
The game of hide and seek, he interprets, is an embodied translation of fairytales (Otogibanashi)
that have been practiced in everyday life by being told and heard repeatedly. In his view, the
movement of underground theaters or small theaters developing since the 1970s in Japan is
an example of the practice of interpretative mimicry of fairytales (EHI:15) in so far as the
game of hide and seek is an imitation or performance of story telling. It reproduces a specific
pattern of narrative in its active embodiment and interactive communication among children
in which sometimes a germ of hierarchical and uneven power-relationship takes place. The
quasi-model of relationship between master and slave, or lord and bondsman, is visible not
only peculiar to Hegelian phenomenology of spirit, but also frequently confirmed within the
micro-politics of child playing that might include potentially a cruel aggression or a form of
bullying among companied kids. The lived experience as such in the game, however, is not
simply a duplication as a mere reflection of the factual world, but a simulation sublimated
from the schema of fairytale that is neither the original nor prototype of social reality through
which people used to live. 
Who is the real author or inventor of fairytales and the game? Fujita posits the question
so. For him it can be supposedly replied that it is ascribed to an anonymous procedure em-
bedded within history as such. This agency can neither be fixed nor located within a linear
agenda and localized sites but being dissimulating itself in a gulf of time and disseminating
itself into its omnipresence regardless with a spatial limitation. As an angel floating in the
air, the anonymous subject (as author and creator of fairytales that are constitutive of “a collective as-
semblage of enunciation” or structural pattern of inter-subjectivity) is emerged and working in the so-
ciety with their fragile vestige. Both fairytales and the game (hide and seek) have an articulated
pattern that has been crystallized in the repetition of routine activities, for both assume a
characteristic of ritual and festival. A festive moment also visible within both fairytales and
the game has shown its most stark nature at the moment of initiation in premodern societies
through which all children should pass when they should obtain and guarantee the ability to
become adults. Initiation (rites of passage), by definition, is a specific periodical moment that
punctuates a symbolic birth and death, and renovates the social order synchronized with
rhythms of the natural environment, as many theories derived from fieldwork in ethnography
and anthropology have clarified and acknowledged so far. Initiation is also the symbolic
process of entering society and at the same time the moment of being spirited away from the
common world of the public sphere, which assumes the actualization and symbolic empow-
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erment of given societies. Both games of hide and seek and fairytales undertake the analogous
function with varied shapes of rituals of initiation as an occasion of the social rebirth and
transition into the sacred or spiritual world. Even the contemporary society supported by
hyper-digital technologies can retain its specific cosmology and counter-partial sacred realm
in a certain extent. The role of demon (oni) in the game of hide and seek encapsulates the ex-
perience of social withdrawal (komori) which is equated with and comparable to a self-isola-
tion or self containment (hikikomori) among youth generations in the contemporary world. As
is known in ancient myth and folklore in Japan, self-withdrawal is not only one of social
phenomena but also has an echo with some ethnographic or mythical facts, for instance as
the anecdote for an entranced dance by Amenouzume in the ancient Japanese myth (“Kojiki”).
The mythical tale of the dancing pagan goddess, Amenouzume, was invoked in order to get
the great sun goddess, Amaterasu, to leave the cave where she had shut herself up. The falling
and rising sun in the myth has been considered to suggest both the celestial cosmological
phenomena of eclipse and ritualistic self-containment in an ethnological sense, komori. Ob-
viously it has been said to denote an institutionalization of divine or spiritual power in the
ancient shamanistic theocracy. The dual play between revelation and concealment that was
immanently posited in philosophical discourses retroactively was embedded within some
types of narrative and rituals for infancy in which ontology and folklore intersected and co-
incided with each other. Then the game of hide and seek in this perspective can be seen as a
modern version of initiation, but in the process of over modernization and hyper-gentrification
it is threatened to be lost and forgotten.
What is intriguing for us in the game kakurenbou is that during the game the children
who are sought and found by the chaser (demon/oni) also attempt to withdraw themselves in
small corners of the street or in tiny rooms, as if in a cave, in their intention of hiding and es-
caping. Symbolic death and rebirth by attempted temporary isolation are lived through both
roles, chaser and those being chased. Although a form of polarity is a basic condition for the
type of game–Agon as Roger Caillois clarified it as so–which consists in antagonism and
competition, all players here pass through the crucial experience of exclusion, isolation, and
alienation from the society they live, that is, a form of symbolic death as members in some
community. The behavior of hiding in the game presents a modified case of social withdrawal
that forms ritual and practice. What is at stake for Fujita’s argument here is that the child as-
signed the role of demon can re-obtain membership among children–which is symbolically
comparable to citizenship under democracy–after discovering the other children who had
hidden themselves somewhere and, in turn, the children as the players will also emancipate
themselves from (social) withdrawal as self-containment. In this manner, the uneven discrep-
ancy of polarity between winner and looser is to be relativized and annihilated in this game
so that an integration within mutual salvation or rescuing  through a mediation of antagonism
takes place. Thus the game of hide and seek provides a utopian (democratic at least) fragment
of another (alter-native) formation of society by which the public sphere in a conventional
sense is to be dismantled and undermined. The game of hide and seek is not merely mimicry
and simulation of society but also positing a virtual transgression against the grain of con-
formity of institutionalized society. 
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Fujita confirms the validity of a vulgar view that myth is an extended fairytale and, in
the same logical vein, a fairytale of secular and fallen modes of myths. Perhaps he acquired
this idea from Ernst Bloch, who, along with Benjamin, argued frequently infancy and child-
hood in each of their elaborations of critical theory, for Fujita was familiar with, and even
echoed, the works of the Frankfurt School. 
“Thus these fairytales are the revolt of the little man against the mythical power,
they are the good sense of Tom Thumb against the giant.” (HOT:153)
By this passage, Ernst Bloch presents the conceptual model of resistance of the little or
minor against the giant or powerful existence within narratives in the genre of fairytales. But
how is such a resistance enabled to emerge in everyday life? What is at stake here seems for
me to be lurking in the notion of repetition. As already suggested, both fairytales and the
game of hide and seek have similar natures in their practices, one of which is repetition. Chil-
dren learn repetition of action and practice. The activity through repetition provides children
with a process of learning and following social habits (habitus) and especially ethos that un-
dertake a quintessential task in social practices. At the same time they also accept the very
meaning of repetition in their living world. Paolo Virno succinctly remarked “perhaps child-
hood is the ontogenetic matrix of every subsequent search for protection from the surrounding
world” (GM:39). As for this issue, it is possible to trace back to the Freudian example of the
spontaneous game of throwing bobbins played by his grandson (“Beyond the Pleasure Principle”). 
In other words, the experience of repetition in childhood is extended and remaining
even in an adult maturity insofar as repetitive behaviors allow children to be embraced by a
kind of asylum escaping from the insufficient situation of contemporary society without fixed
ethos, habitus, and tradition delivered along with precedent generations. As Freudian psy-
choanalysis clarified, children protect themselves by means of repetition that can shape a
form of fairytale or playing game with reel in Freudian explanation. An experience of repe-
tition is envisioned as the defensive mechanism in front of a certain cognitive-affective shock
caused by unexpected events and new current of living world due to an emergence of new
technology and its environments. Unlike traditional societies, there is no choice to return to
a substantial common habit in our contemporary world, but rather the experience within a
new formation of capital and society urges us to obey different forms of ethos and habits.
In nature of repetition in the varied activities of contemporary society affords an occa-
sion of lesson to be accustom for the condition of contemporary working firms ironically,
especially in the so-called post-Fordist mode of labor formation, which has its crucial basis
in the “distraction” and playful activity in its multi-intended cognitive-affective process. Be-
cause in this formation one not only has to work and learn in each disciplinary archipelago
within modern societies, but also has to “learn to learn” divergent things in its self-reflexive
or recursive cycle of activity, be it operative of working firms or school as disciplinary insti-
tutions. Human agency in this context should repeat and imitate some specific behaviors and
modes of communication as if children should  have done so for their growth and develop-
ment. Then a certain type of habit can arises here to come up with the latest formation of
labor force and collective intellect (or “general intellect,” Marx and Italian Autonomists might prefer
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to call it).
The nature of repetition in both game and fairytale, however, cannot be reduced to the
premised part of discipline for the formation of capitalism and its way of life. Both practices
always contain something tactical against the grain or system and institutionalization within
everyday life. Repetition becomes one of the tactics of a magical solution for the social or
political contradiction and suffering people experience in their daily life, although it is to be
ascribed to the paralyzing effect of intoxication. When children realize they can no longer
play magical rituals, they encounter the reality of conventional society and the time of ma-
turity, just as Benjamin once clarified. In a similar vein, as already remarked, the example of
the performative game of throwing bobbin reels played by Freud’s grandson suggests the
significance of the repetition in getting accustomed to the formalization of social or moral
life.
By addressing Benjamin, Agamben contends that the toy belongs to “the realm of the
sacred or of the practical economic,” at the same time can transform it drastically (IH:78-80).
For the period of infancy, the toy is a medium of magic–that is operative of magical solution
of personal incapacity at the very least, if not social contradiction–and traces a materialization
of historicity immanent in things and objects, in which the sedimented experience in the time
is miniaturized “the imitated as a cipher or sign of history and development of modernity it-
self. But if some fairytales such as Tom Thumb can be a resource for “the weak and little”
against “the giant” embodying the power as Ernst Bloch contended, the varied kinds of toys
could also serve as tactical survival tool kits of little men, especially for children. Just as in
the terminology in popular cultural studies, magic, and rituals are defined as the means of
resolving the contradictions and suffering, it is possible and helpful to invoke the notion of
a magical resource in the infantile playing with toys in which the attempt of montage and as-
semblage is constantly activated.
Bloch’s Inheritance of the Time was written in the period of interwar, as one of the cul-
minations of crisis in Europe. “Dust, distraction, and intoxication,” the triad of terms is crucial
for comprehending the conceptual core of this work, especially the chapters written about
the period of pre-fascism in Germany. “Dust” emblematizes here all transient and ephemeral
phenomena and objects in the modern industrial life, which encompasses the world of com-
modity. The term contains the spectrum of predicament of the high rate of unemployment at
the time, and all its subsequent economic or social turmoil and mental apathies.
“Distraction” indicates the aspects of entertainment and play in the coming popular mass
society, in which the varied fairgrounds of diversion ignores the alienation of everyday life
and distracts people from it (HOT:33). It also shapes a specific type of concentration in diverse
vectors of affection and (re-)cognition within the emergent industrial societies. Under more
complexity of technological or cognitive labor formation in our contemporary social condi-
tion, varied attention by humans must be simultaneously  poured into diverse vectors. Al-
though it might sound strange, one should pay attention to different vectors constantly in
order to be concentrated enough for controlling, working, and manipulating in the operation
in a techno-info-environment within contemporary labor firms of cognitive capitalism. Driv-
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ing cars, piloting airplanes, and using computers, or editing and remixing data, all demands
permanently such a specific type of “concentration distracted” or “concentrated distraction”
in which our secret infancy is lingering permanently. As an example of the early rudimental
stage of late capitalism, Benjamin’s famous thesis (in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction”) that cinema provides the occasion and process of training of new form of per-
ception is to be recalled.
“Intoxication” appears by replacing distraction in the civilization of the 20th century.
Much later after the development of capitalism, it found its own actual existential mode in
the usage of varied drugs–just as Benjamin also found the significance of intoxication and
ecstatic state of mind by drugs–but its quintessential moment had already been set out within
the early stage of capitalistic society. Bloch describes,
“The truly last phase of capitalism contains, in a relatively advanced way, the ver-
satile aspect of diversion and the mixed darkness of intoxication, in short, it con-
tains the relativistic and archaic aspects together. The former, as an element of
diversion, is in the naked, apparent, overly bright ‘Objectivity’, the latter as an el-
ement of intoxication, lives above all in the ruined and mixed figures of the various
kinds of ‘montage’.” (HOT:197)
The scene of “Objectivity” (Sachlichkeit) represents the world of distraction and diversion
of which I have already explained earlier, while the intoxication unfolds the moment of the
archaic and Dionysian in our civilization. Both moments of the premodern and archaic have
always been utilized and appropriated in the deployment of capitalism and its adjunct process
of “secondly reified” education and literature. The infancy has permanently been fed by this
primal “infotainment” that replaced the essence of Enlightenment. But at the same time, the
infancy could be provided with their tactical resource, the playful, pleasurable, and magical
experiment of “montage” (or assemblage in more contemporary terminology). Intoxication is always
lingering within the scene, as the dark reverse side, of dust and distraction in our life. Thus
in both fairytale and playing, children accept the mode of timing “once upon a time” as some-
thing very familiar and uncanny.
As is well know, a coupling of infancy and language is inextricably tied up with the ety-
mological root of the term infantia, which is revolving around a pivot from the non-linguistic
status to the narrative setting of the living world. Playing with toys or at games, and receiving
or accepting fairytales, all activity of infancy affords us the process of mediating both stages
of infancy (in which it is impossible to speak), and language, put differently, catalyzing a synthesis
between non-discursive articulation and discursive articulation of reality in their very oppo-
sition.
“That which did not grow around the tastes all the better to lads everywhere. Each
of them dreams the deeds of his colorful while he is reading them, and forgets them
some time after waking up. And yet the reader of colportage can even lack the
awareness that he is reading, just as the dreamer can that he is dreaming. Such a
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book can be read several times and is forgotten again and again.” (HOT:164)
In these passages, the term colportage might be somehow unfamiliar or strange for us.
But from a more contemporary view it can be defined as a kind of vulgar entertainment-ori-
ented fiction or “Roman,” which is treated as a genre of narrative (so called raito noberu, light
novel, in Japan, or the “young adult” genre as its counterpart in the Anglophone world). In other words,
the term colportage is helpful to argue the recent situation of the publishing sector in Japan
and its interpretive horizon by audiences. If fairytale is the declined mode of myth, it can be
said that colportage is a doubly alienated and transformed version of myth. Most entertain-
ment has a specific type of narrative structure which is so common and typical among dif-
ferent pieces that audiences can easily enjoy it without any special literacy. That is the
condition for vulgar genres of fiction and novels but which is comparable to the basic struc-
ture of fairytale because readers can accept them repeatedly by its user-friendly patterns. In
this sense, the genre of colportage is a modern version of fairytale but not necessarily as-
suming a form and means of resistance in the contemporary society. Colportage may appear
as the vulgar genre of fiction, but at the same time provides readers with a kind of skill of
editing patterns of specific plots and narratives. It always consists in relentless combination,
remixing, and composing the moments which had already existed before in the layered
“archives” of pieces of expressive culture written or presented in the past time of periods. 
The game of hide and seek also has another version that can arrange and modify its
rules performatively, for which the editing arrangement is enacted contingently. Thus mon-
tage/assemblage is always visible in both the versions of game and fairytale. As is well
known, the notion of montage is a crucial concept for critical theory, with which Benjamin,
Adorno, Bloch, and all Frankfurters grappled conceptually in each of their masterpieces. The
juxtaposition and combination of heterogeneous fragmentary moments of phenomena or
events, no matter what might be constituted by things or human agency, were a tactical means
of addressing society and culture in modernity. The same is true for Fujita’s works. Montage
does not necessarily consist of combination and assembling, but rather is enabled by disman-
tling and démontage that can bring about the emergence of an unforeseen set of composition
of cultural elements. 
In his essay titled “Culture of New Goods Commodities–Glittering Materials” (Shinpin
Bunka–Pika Pika no Shoyo, 1981) in the same book, his criticism against the current of postwar
consumer society with its speculative or “bubble” economy in the 1980s especially reexam-
ines the very notion of experience critically. Experience, in his definition, is “an interaction
between things (or event) and humans” in which human agency always has to face up with a
certain resistance from materials and a detour at addressing them as a kind of mediation.
When one utilizes the things in a certain extent of improvisation, not merely comforted in
the determined usages of commodified gadgets and technology one always encounters a cer-
tain resistances (obstacle, difficulty, or trouble), for the things can always betray human intention
and man cannot use the things at their disposal. In other works, the resistance from the things
in human experiences permanently indicates nothing more than the anamnesis or memorizing
of the very objects, things, and events. That is the reason why Fujita considers humans as an
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agency of experience to be the third pole mediating  between the other two: living beings
and objective things (including technology to use them). He envisions the subject as an effect of
the dynamic relation, that is, of the relentless mutual resistance and potential dis-communi-
cation among polarity of the two. Reconciliation with given materials, to solve such a trouble
or obstacle, is never achieved by the current of novelty in the world of commodity which
constantly urges us to use, purchase, and be simply comforted and enthusiastic for the fol-
lowing new products and goods under that stage of post-Fordist formation of capitalism.
Turning back to our own recent everyday life in the Japanese info-environment system that
is observable in the blogosphere, SNS, Twitter, and all kinds of net culture, this symptomatic
propensity of all hypes of novelty seems to be more intense with its tragic-comedic tone
nowadays. 
Experience, for Fujita, is a result of crystallization of singular encountering with events
or things. Commodities in the consumer society which consists of infinite numbers of mod-
ules that always hide their crucial technological clue as a black box, lack the trace of a dy-
namic interaction between things and human beings. On the contrary, the things within the
operative of montage or bricolage must always contain a mutual resistance among partial
moments by mediation which passes through interruption, citation, and insertion in order to
realize the reconciliation with, and transformation of, any given original fragments of things
and commodities. Fujita had never trusted the world of new goods or gadgets in contemporary
consumer society (a novelty of commodity and technology) also be called the “the society of spec-
tacle” which Guy Debord succinctly articulated. The “culture of new goods” (Shinpin Bunka)
he named the current which seemed for him to have been established throughout the period
of Japanese post war  “economic growth,” consists in the common sense and world as a hori-
zon in which a mass as “ordinary” population is mobilized by mainstream media and eu-
phorically dependent on the conformity of society (Seken). Against such a lifestyle of majority,
he would like to present the potential tactics of utilizing montage/bricolage among things,
tools, and gadgets in the everyday life without a permanent dominancy and dependence upon
the packaged commodities provided by postwar and postmodern capitalism in Japan Although
his view in this essay had not yet deployed the discourse of DiY or alternative usage of tech-
nology or over-merchandized resources, his argument obviously follows the same line of
thought with cultural bricolage that is potentially observed in children’s toy playing as we
confirmed in reviewing his essay.
The placenta of experience had already been lost in the 20th century. We all have been
“abandoned” (Wareware wa ikasareteiru). This is Fujita’s diagnosis on the situation in the early
1980s that highly coveys a pessimistic tone. In the final section of the essay on Kakurenbou,
Fujita engages with the detailed interpretation of Benjamin’s essay on Brecht by reading his
lines of poetry almost one by one. It is not necessary for us to follow his very literal analysis,
but instead this conclusive part of his essay is to be examined in another perspective. Col-
lective imagination of humans has had “integration that one salvages and emancipates mu-
tually but by opposing each other in antagonism.” (EHI:34) Benjamin draws the instruction
from the poetry of Brecht, “the winner should share the experience of the looser,” which
echoes Fujita’s interpretation of the game of hide and seek and the fairytale. But, as is already
018 和光大学表現学部紀要　15 号・2015 年 3 月
known, the game was swept away from streets, while the initiation also disappeared. Fujita
stood up here in his critical perplex, which nevertheless posits an erupted gap inserted in the
current of capitalism. The beginnings can only emerge from an interruption of experience,
not as a mere jumping. Although Fujita’s overview on the grain of gentrification of urbanity
and germ of neoliberal capitalism assumes the tone of pessimism that looks very akin to the
thought by Adorno, the potential in his essay would run further and forward. 
Reification and alienation caused by the rationalization of society, without the reason
through all ideological apparatus of overflowing technology and its adjacent commodified
gadgets in the ongoing capitalism, must erase the tactical experiences immanent in both fairy-
tale and game, but at the same time bring about a primal form of bio-politics. Where Fujita
found the withering and disappearance of the game of hide and seek, and the absence of ini-
tiation (rite of passage) in the contemporary society, the apparatus taking “care” of life emerged
as a sort of “incubator” prevailing in a whole aspect of life. (EHI:38) Herein the set of expe-
rience of “exile and wondering” is already embedded within the so-called life-span education
(Seijinkyouiku). With the setting of the “incubator” for life, the meaning of initiation and some
games is lost and abandoned. However, the experience of trial contained in the ritual of ini-
tiation is just imposed for us as the “bare substance” or “naked reality” (Hadaka no Jitsubutsu),
no longer as a performative game and playing. The completely new time of barbarism
emerges here. There is neither anymore self-containment for a symbolic rebirth nor a relief
against anxiety in our society (perhaps the 1980s onward). The neutral axis observed by Benjamin
in which the fear against awakening makes our sleeping anxious and is also ruined and dis-
appears. Only the uncanny “bare initiation” in the form of “incubator” that totally lost the
meaning of rite of passage becomes dominant in our life and society.
Obviously his use of the term “bare initiation” reminds us the critical assessment of bio-
politics raised by Agamben. The term “incubator” should be read and interpreted in the light
of critical philosophy of bio-power. Fujita’s conceptual posture looks at the counterpart of
the Frankfurters such as Adorno, but it is not exaggerating to contend that in his similar tactics
of salvaging the parts of the past and folklore with that of Bloch, his thoughts can be consid-
ered to be a precursor of philosophy of bio-power because Fujita’s position is neither ended
at merely lamenting our living condition nor aimed at nostalgic yearning for pre-modern so-
cieties. But how is it possible for us to survive in this incubator? What is a breakthrough for
this challenge is to be also drawn from another essay or presentation by Fujita.  
A book called The Thought of Postwar Japan (Sengonihon no Shisou) was published in
1966 by three postwar intellectuals: Kuno Osamu (who introduced the Frankfurt School to Japan
in the 1930s), Tsurumi Shunsuke (philosopher and organizer of the Peace Civil Association for Vietnam
in the late 1960’s), and Fujita Shozo (philosopher). Although presented in a round table style,
this book is atypical for such styles in Japan in that it is neither ad-hoc nor improvised; rather
each man mutually reviews presentations posited at the beginning of each chapter. 
In the final chapter of the book, “Philosophical Meaning of War Experience–Intellectual
and Mass,” Fujita quoted lines from a novel. From a contemporary viewpoint, Ishihara as
politician-novelist seems at least an ethnocentric xenophobic populist if not an outright fascist
and racist. But Fujita argued positively regarding the morals and vision of the delinquent
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youth in the novel “Season of the Sun” (Taiyo no Kisetsu). His argument was not a simple cel-
ebration but a subtle affirmative interpretation which contained a creative clue to understand
a tie between the delinquent youths of the novel and postwar democracy that is useless to
throw all in the dustbin. Fujita regarded the plot and narrative in Ishihara’s novel as an emer-
gent model of civil society through deviancy, conflict, and criminality. It merits quotation at
length.
“Ishihara’s novel “The Season of the Sun” is very interesting. His case presents
antagonism, which is most intriguing for me. What is at issue as the theme of this
novel is that the very pleasure of being resisted by somebody is an enjoyment as
such of everyday life. By daring to resist and provoke Japanese society, at the mo-
ment when the reaction arises within, he could hold the very feeling of life. Ishihara
does not conceive of any kind of principle as grounds for determining a vector of
resistance; there is no converging energy but just taking frustrations out in divergent
centrifugal vectors. “The Season of the Sun” hints at a method of resistance, how-
ever, an idea which conceives something like a paradoxical civil society in order
to resist against Japanese (conventional) society. It should not be a harmonious closed
group in which one understands others’ inward affections mutually. Friendship can
never consist by itself, but rather it establishes itself only on the grounds of ac-
counting and materializing friendship. That is why the characters in this novel can
sometimes break with friend who only accumulates deficits by recording balance
sheet of sensibility among friends. In this view, such a type of friendship is our
own one but it is not easily decomposed but rather cooperating vice heightens com-
munal solidarity as/via complicity. That is exactly a structure of civil society, I
think, which is in parallel with negative (minus) moment of civil society in order to
constitute community competing with international society by accounting interests
each other, positing alliance, and also strengthening nationalism. There is a kind
of vision of criminal civil society.”
I think this passage interesting because it sheds light upon “equality or democracy
within/through antagonism” inherent in a criminal (unmoral or illegal) activity by deviant boys
(potentially girls as their accompanying partners) in Japan in the 1950s. The combination alluded
to in this passage between altruism and egoism reminds us of French Philosopher, Jacques
Rancière’s notion of distribution (sharing division or partition) of the sensible, partage, and dis-
sensus. Dissensus is not merely the confrontation between different interests, views, and
opinions, but rather is the emergent presentation of a distance of the sensible from itself.
The paradoxical equality specific to a fraternal community of delinquent boys in postwar
Japanese society–which is potentially very masculine and misogynic in the world of Ishihara’s
novels–is an endless balancing or interchangeability of debit and credit. Certainly this inter-
pretation is tricky at the risk of falling prey into society dominated by male bonds. In “The
Season of the Sun,” the protagonist and his elder brother abuse his girlfriend through a kind
of “deal” that is envisioned as a nasty mode of “exchange of woman.” It is never possible to
see any affirmative sense of communication. However, Fujita, well before his criticism
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against postmodern capitalism, was engaged with the interpretive salvation of some eman-
cipative layers built in Ishihara’s novel and literature. Put differently, Fujita finds the different
mode of montage of organizing groups and arranging collaboration within the life of delin-
quent boys (unfortunately not from girls!).
He envisioned the primal condition of democracy and civil society through the notion
and activity of antagonism. Antagonism has sometimes been treated as something contribut-
ing  to democracy in its ideal formation. Equal relationships of humans arise through conflict
and antagonism. Even Kant utilized this term in a positive sense for an international regime
of cosmopolitan democracy and hypothetical analysis of history on the beginnings of society.
There have been some types of argument emphasizing antagonism for the reasonable grounds
to elaborate democratic society.
At least two examples are to be raised: First, postmodern critical theory posited a notion
of differend (litege) and antagonism via Kant, in which the incommensurability among mutual
hostile interests was constitutive, but at the same time a critical moment of the liberal and
enlightened society. Second, for Laclau and Mouffe, the concept of antagonism was utilized
as a kind of nodal point for stabilizing the chains of equivalence of plural values derived
from varied social movements and democratic initiatives. According to them the improvement
and striving of more democratic politics needs the intensification or extension of chains of
equivalence which weave and combine the varieties of struggles. (HS: 182) The logic of equiv-
alence in the end necessitates the dissolution of the autonomy of the spaces in which each
democratic initiatives and movements are located.
Antagonism in both views does not confirm a position of mere relativism and pluralism,
but rather a basis of political process, a dissensus which resists jurisprudence or legal insti-
tution and weaves a gap or fissure creatively in the sensible regime and order with the  inad-
missible, untamed, and indomitable. Many readers, at least in Japan, treat Rancière’s as a
philosopher of equality. But what type of equality is at stake in this context? Rancière’s con-
ception cannot be reduced to a mere recommendation or encouragement toward a common,
humanistic, horizontal equality built within mutual help and ethical reciprocity. Rather his
perspective deconstructs the notion of equality as such by passing through the political
process of dissensus. For him, the “equality is a presupposition, not a goal to be attained”
and at the moment of rarity of presence of politics, dissensus or antagonism of democracy
can emerge. Only equality enables us to think and generate politics when it is implemented
in a form of dissensus and antagonistic solidarity, not in a mutual horizontal solidarity. Does
it mean that “we are all those who have no part?”  Or is it the issue of dissensus between
those who have no part and the ones who have? Certainly equality is ascribed to the common,
but it doesn’t indicate an arithmetic equality that is realized by a quantitative commonality.
Equality in Rancière’s conception, unlike an arithmetic one undertaken by conventional (new
and old) leftism, is about distribution, sharing, and division of varied affects (operative of the
sensible). It also constitutes itself as a sustainable or balanced set horizon of qualitative inten-
sity of affects. The distribution of sharing division or partition of the sensible and non-sen-
sible, sayable and non-sayable, audible and non-audible, visible and non-visible, a decision
of form of exclusion and inclusion, where dispute, rather than reasoning or dialogue, is an
integrative moment of criticizing and subverting the police order, morality and jurisprudence
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in a conventional sense. A community of sharing or partition whose belonging is articulated
in antagonism and adversary coupling can only occur in the form of conflict.
Again Fujita’s question is summed up like this: Is there any way to reorganize and trans-
form activism and antagonism in Ishihara’s novel toward anti-conformists or a dissident vec-
tor? The same question is still being posited in the everyday life of our contemporary society. 
In his small paper “What is Enlightenment?,” Kant succinctly defined Enlightenment
as a public use of reason to which all humankind should be indebted to his/her responsibility
and autonomy. It is interesting that this debt or responsibility is also interpreted as a kind of
“crime” or “criminality.” Mankind is responsible for the immaturity of their reason that un-
dertakes a form  of “private use” of reasoning (discourse, knowledge, and communicative resources)
that transforms people into “small parts of a machine” (by Kant’s terminology), which is called
“incubator” in Fujita’s essay on the game of hide and seek in a sense, Enlightenment as public
use of reasoning is not only the premised condition for civil society but also indicates its in-
extricable tie with “crime” or “deviancy” as moral panic or debt which is based on public
knowledge such as mentors or books.
On the contrary, public use of reason as an exodus (outcome) from private use is of indi-
vidual cognitive-affective technology. Enlightenment demands the exodus and desertion from
an obedience to others, that is, the heteronomy, in the demand that puts reason to be in service
to public society as “a kind of machine,” shifting toward individual thought built within the
process of collective individuation (assemblage of enunciation) in the critical space such as the
publishing sector. In a Kantian political program or imperative, the order is imposed: Dispute,
having debate relentlessly, but obey not the despot, but rather the enlightened prince or au-
thority, and potentially yourself, that enables to constitute the condition of Enlightenment in
his understanding. But for us, through a more or less ‘intensive’ reading of Fujita’s essay and
view, it is possible to assume the play or game among delinquent youths as the premised
condition for democracy and less controlled societies.
Even within delinquent behaviors and communication, there is a chance for mutual sol-
idarity. Then the contemporary imperative is to be : the attitude to disobey (against everything
and each other) can lead to deliberation and more open-ended communication, which is a primal
ideal type of democracy. After withering some rituals and games, the strange combination
between Enlightenment and deviancy/delinquency is waiting for us. Delinquency can stand
as a supplement of initiation and different modernity. In this sense, both infancy and critical
theory bind each other. 
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